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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16098

-vsCLINTON ROBERTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with forgery, a felony of
the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-501 (1953).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried and convicted before a jury of
uttering, with purpose to defraud, a bank check in the amount
of $331.14 purporting to bear the signature of David Farmer,
in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in

'
and for Utah County, Utah,
the Honorable George E. Ballif,
presiding.

Appellant was sentenced to confinement in the

Utah State Prison for a period of not less than one nor more
than
fifteen
years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the conviction
and judgment entered against the appellant in the lower
court.

In addition, respondent seeks a decision from

this Court upholding the sentencing procedure used below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 24, 1978, appellant entered Bullock's
Billiards, 190 West Center, Provo, Utah, with two other men,
Ned Lynn Topham and Terry Moore (T.26,40).

Appellant had

obtained a check drawn on the account of the All-Weather
Insulation Company from Terry Moore (T.28), who had
previously been an employee of All-Weather (T.23).

Upon

entering Bullock's Billiards, appellant told Mr. Mortenson,
an employee of Bullock's, that he was Glen Reynolds (T.ll).
Appellant endorsed a check for $331.14 payable to Glen
Reynolds and Mortenson gave him $100.00 (T.ll).

The

remaining $231.14 was received by Terry Moore on Harch 27,
1978 (T.l2), for the appellant.
At trial, the appellant chose to take the witness
stand.

On cross-examination, he was asked whether he had

previously been convicted of a felony (T.48).

The appellant

answered in the affirmative, stating that the offense was
for insufficient fund checks (T.48).

No objection to this
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line of questioning was made.

Appellant now contends that

the questioning (expressly authorized by Utah Code Ann.
§

78-24-9 (1953)ldenied him equal protection of the law.
The jury found the appellant guilty of violating

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1953)

(T. 75), and counsel for

appellant requested that a presentence report be compiled
(T.77).

This request was granted and imposition of sentence

was set for September 8, 1978 (T.78).

This date was later

changed to September 15, 1978 (R.l5).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-9 (1953), AS AMENDED,
IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH Al'1ENDMENT.
Appellant asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9
(1953), as amended, which allows the prosecution on crossexamination to ask a witness if he has previously been
convicted of a felony, creates an invidious discrimination
against him, depriving him of equal protection of the laws
because the admission of this evidence "minimizes his
opportunity for a fair trial upon the relevant issues as
compared to a defendant not yet having been convicted of a
previous felony."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 8.)

Appellant

also alleges that Section 78-24-9 is not supported by any
rational basis for differentiation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The appellant bases his argument on Amendment
XIV of the United States Constitution:
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law.
Th8 concept embodied in Section 78-24-9, which
the appellant attacks, is a time-honored rule dating back
to 1898.

The English Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 removed

the accused's incompetence to testify and enabled an accused's
record of prior convictions to get before a jury under certain
conditions.

1

The United States first adopted the rule in 1911
when a Pennsylvania Statute closely followed
of the English Act.

2

the provisions

Since that time, the general rule with

regard to prior convictions has been that such evidence is
admissible to show intent, motive, plan, etc., character of
the witness, and credibility of the witness.
Appellant's contentions are without merit for
several reasons.

1
2

First, the appellant is barred from raising

Wigmore, I Wigmore on Evidence
Ibid., p. 657.

§

194a, pp. 652-659.
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an equal protection argument since he failed to assert
such argument in the lower court.

Appellant's counsel

failed to object and is now raising the issue for the
first time.
In the instant case, witness Roberts was asked
whether he had previously been convicted, the date of
the conviction, and the nature of the conviction (T.48).
The failure of the defense attorney to object could have
been trial strategy; perhaps he did not want to stress the
fact and felt it was unnecessary to object.

In any event,

if he failed to voice objection he cannot raise the issue
for review on appeal.

Further, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9

(1953), as amended, provides that "a witness must answer
as to the fact of his previous conviction of felony," and
thus the prosecution had the right, sanctioned by statute,
to adduce evidence of appellant's prior felony convictions
once appellant took the stand; therefore, appellant's
contention is without merit.
conviction could have been

The evidence of prior

ad~itted

to show intent,

knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident.
Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule 55,

In addition, the evidence of

prior conviction could have been introduced to impeach
appellant's credibility once he had taken the stand.
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Appellant, however, contends that this situation
constitutes an exception to the rule of practice which
provides that an issue cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.

In Krause v. Sacramento, 479 F.2d 988

(1973), relied on by appellant, the Ninth Circuit agreed
to hear an equal protection argument not raised in the
Federal District Court and said:
Relaxation of this rule is sometimes
appropriate in appeals wherein there are
significant questions of general impact or
when injustice might otherwise result.
Id. at 989.
The commPnts adduced by the prosecutor in the
instant case were elicited during fundamental foundation
questions to the State's witness; they were not emphasized
nor highlighted by further testimony and, therefore, are
not prejudicial to appellant.

The rationale of Krause,

therefore, is inapplicable.
In making a determination of the constitutionality
of statutes, the duty rests upon the courts to determine
the scope of the powers of all three branches of government
and they must exercise a high degree of restraint to keep
themselves from infringing upon the prerogatives of the
executive or the legislative branches.

It is, therefore,

a well established rule that legislative enactments carry
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a "strong presumption of validity" and "should not be
declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable
basis upon which they can be found to come within the
constitutional framework."

Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d

805, 807 (Utah 1974).
The Court in Greaves upheld the constitutionality
of Utah Code Ann.

§

41-61-12 (1953), as amended, as legis-

lation reasonably related to a valid state interest and
stated further that a statute \vould not be stricken down
as being unconstitutional unless it appeared to he
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.

Respondent

submits that the appellant has not shown that Section
78-24-9 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As noted above, the respondent contends that
there is no "classification" on which to base an equal
protection argument.

Assuming, arguendo, that the

statute in question does set up a scheme of classification,
an appropriate standard of review must be chosen.

In

assessing the constitutionality of a statute on a denial
of equal protection theory, two tests have traditionally
been applied.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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One test requires that a compelling state interest
be the purpose behind the statute.

This test is applied

when one of the following suspect classifications is
involved:

race, alienage, wealth, indigency and

illegitimacy.
In ordinary cases, like the instant one, the
reviewing court will apply the rule that differential
treatment is valid providing there is a reasonable basis
for the classification.

Courts have recognized a presumption

which operates in favor of the reasonableness of legislative
classifications.

If any state of facts can reasonably be

conceived that would justify the classification, the existence
of those facts will be assumed by the court to be the basis
for the classification in order to uphold the legislation.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct.
337, 55 L.Ed. 369

(1911); Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805

(Utah 1974).
B.

APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE

Utah Code Ann.
a legitimate purpose.

§

78-24-9

(1953), as amended, serves

This purpose was outlined in State v.

Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 263, 382 P.2d 407 (1963), when this court
stated:
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The apparent purpose and reason for
permitting the prosecution to question the
accused regarding prior felony convictions
is to affect his credibility as a witness.
However, the details or circumstances
surrounding the felony or felonies for
which the accused was convicted may not be
inquired into except under unusual circumstances, when the inquiry would tend to
show a scheme, plan, modus operandi, or
the like. In the instant case the details
of the prior felony conviction were not
asked of the defendant.
Id. at 409.
In Kazda, the defendant appealed from a conviction
of assault with intent to commit murder and robbery and
assigned as error the fact that on cross-examination, it
was elicited that he had several prior felony convictions,
unrelated to the instant charge, and that the admission of
the evidence amounted to a general assault upon his character
constituting prejudicial error.

This Court found the

appellant's argument to be without merit stating that when a
defendant voluntarily takes the witness stand he may be
asked whether or not he has ever been convicted of a felony
and this question is sanctioned by the statute.
409.

Kazda at

The rational basis of the statute, therefore, is to

test the credibility'of the defendant as a witness the same
as would be done for any other witness.
77-44-5 (1953), states:
a witness, he

~ay

Utah Code Ann.

§

"If a defendant offers himself as

be cross-examined by the counsel for the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

state the same as any other witness • • •
Ann. § 78-24-9

Utah Code

(1953), as amended, states:

A witness must answer questions legal
and pertinent to the matter in issue, • • •
[including] a witness must answer as to the
fact of his previous conviction of felony.
State v. Harless, 23 Utah 2d 128, 459 P.2d 210 (1969).
This Court in Harless described the state
interest involved here:
That this type of interrogation (asking
a defendant if he had been convicted of a
felony) is generally allowed derives from
the idea that there is a basis in reason
and experience why one may place more
credence in the testimony of one who has
lived within the rules of society and the
discipline of the law than in that of one
who has demonstrated antisocial tendency
as to be involved in and convicted of
serious crime.
The Court went on to say:
• • • it seems hardly fair to suppress
such facts and let him (the defendant) testify
with the same credit as one who has led a more
blameless life. The exposure of the felony
record of an accused of course does not mean
that his testimony is necessarily to be
entirely disbelieved or discredited, but
inasmuch as it is the resnonsibility or--the
jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
it is deemed to be something which they are
enTitled to know so they can take it into
consideration with all the other facts and
Clrcumstances in determining what they will
believe.
Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
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More recent Utah cases have similarly upheld
the use of Section 78-24-9.

State v. Bennett, 517 P.2d

1029 (1973), State v. Duran, 522 P.2d 1374 (1974), and
State v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335 (1977).
Utah Code Ann.

§

78-24-9 (1953), as amended,

therefore, is constitutional.

It has a rational basis

in that it serves as a means of testing the credibility of
a witness.

In addition, it serves a legitimate state

interest in supplying the court and the jury with information which is helpful to them in determining what they
will and will not believe.
POINT II
THE DECISION TO FURNISH A DEFENDANT WITH A
COPY OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT RESTS
WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL
COURT; APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND
CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES '1-IERE NOT DENIED
SINCE THIS DISCRETION 'l-IAS NOT ABUSED.
Appellant contends that the unavailability of a
copy of the presentence report and the fact that the court,
in making its decision not to place him on probation relied
on information in that report, effectively denied the
appellant of his rights to counsel and to confrontation
of the witnesses.

Appellant claims that his right to

confrontation of the witnesses was denied because Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Code Ann.

§

77-35-13 (1953), as amended, states that circum-

stances in aggravation and mitigation of the punishment to
be imposed must be presented by the testimony of witnesses
in open court.

This contention is without merit.

This Court has consistently held that the decision
to furnish a defendant with a copy of the presentence
report rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
In the case of State v. Doremus, 29 Utah 2d 373, 510 P.2d
529 (1971), the defendant sought reversal of her sentence
on the sole ground that the court failed to allow the
defense to inspect the presentence report.

This Court held:

In order that there be no doubt as to
what we believe to be the proper rule, it
is the opinion of this court that it be
left to the sound discretion of the trial
court to determine whether or not the
contents of the presentence investigation
report should be furnished to the defendant.
Id. at 529.
This statement of the law was reaffirmed in
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (1978), where the appellant
claimed that the court

co~~itted

reversible error by not

disclosing the contents of the presentence report to the
defendant and his counsel.

Once again, this Court stated

that whether the presentence report should be furnished to
the defendant is something vrhich rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
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In another recent case, Reddish v. Smith, 576 P.2d
859

(1978), the defendant requested a presentence report.

The Court received the report but did not make it available
to the defendant.
State Prison.

The defendant was sentenced to the Utah

On appeal, the appellant claimed that the

report contained false information and that he was denied an
opportunity to rebut such information.

There was no claim

that the appellant was being held under an improper sentence.
This Court held that while "the discretion of the court would
permit it to indicate to defendant's counsel the nature'of
the statements made and then permit the defendant to offer
evidence on the matter," there was no obligation to permit
inspection of the presentence report.
It should be noted that there were two dissents in
the Reddish case, due largely to the fact that the defendant
claimed that the presentence report was inaccurate and that
he should have had the opportunity to determine if the court
had relied on the alleged inaccuracies in assessing the sentence.
In the present case, however, no claim of inaccuracy has been
made.

In addition, the lower court specifically stated that

it was relying on the defendant's past record in denying
probation.

The appellant's counsel was asked to verify that

information:
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THE COURT:
. But probation
isn't indicated in Mr. Robert's case.
His ~e~rd is too long.
He has been
in trouble too much.
THE COURT: He has had probation
revoked twice and he has had parole
revoked twice. That's right, isn't
it?
Appellant's brief, p. 23.
The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion
by relying on the information contained in the presentence
report to assess the sentence and to deny inspection of the
report.
CONCLUSION
The history of equal protection is indicative of
the court's unfledging resolve to ensure equality of
treatment before the law.

Respondent, however, submits that

the equal protection doctrine was never intended to protect
defendants from treatment accorded to all witnesses.
Appellant has, as do all defendants, the right to refrain
from taking the witness stand.

Once he makes the decision

to testify, he becomes a witness, subject to examination to
test his credibility as any witness.

Moreover, appellant

failed to raise his equal protection claim to the court
below and failed to object to the questioning he now complains
of.

Thus, he has waived the right to raise the issue for the

first time on appeal.
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying appellant's request to see the presentence report.
The appellant was aware of those facts relied on by the
court in denying probation and failed to provide evidence
that the information was inaccurate.
On the basis of the above authority and the
evidence at trial, respondent asserts that the judgment
of the lower court was proper and prays that the verdict
and sentence be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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